Slide #1
CausalImpact
CausalImpact
CausalImpact
Slide #2
David Hume and the perennial epistemological problem of inferred causality
Causality is a longstanding and profound problem in the philosophy of science. The Scottish philosopher David Hume provided strong arguments suggesting that establishing causality is, in principio, impossible. This epistemological approach has some similarities with Karl Popper's systematic work on the impossibility of "ultimate proof" in scientific theories.
Hume argued that our understanding of causality is based on habit and experience rather than logical necessity. We observe sequences of events and infer a causal relationship because of their constant conjunction, but we never directly perceive a necessary connection between cause and effect. This means that causality is a product of the mind's tendency to expect the future to resemble the past based on repeated experiences, rather than an objective feature of reality itself (cf. Kant).
* * *
You can also highlight specific text segments with your cursor in order to submit it to text-to-speech synthesis.
David Hume's investigation into causality is a cornerstone in philosophy, particularly highlighted in "A Treatise of Human Nature" and "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding." Hume approaches causality through an empirical lens, arguing that our understanding stems not from logical reasoning but from habitual experience.
To explain his theory, Hume offers two definitions of causation:

1. External Definition (D1): An object precedes another, and all similar objects are related in precedence and contiguity.
2. Internal Definition (D2): An object precedes and is contiguous to another, such that the idea of one prompts the mind to form the idea of the other, creating a more vivid concept of the second object

These definitions illustrate that causation encompasses both an external observation of events and an internal mental process. The first definition pertains to the observable, external world, while the second definition relates to the psychological experience of causality.
Hume's skepticism about causation has significant implications for science. He argues that scientific laws and our assumptions about cause and effect are not based on logical necessity but rather on observed regularities. This perspective challenges the certainty of scientific knowledge, suggesting that much of our understanding is built on inference and habituation, not absolute certainty and genuine understanding.
Hume uses the example of a rooster crowing to illustrate his views on causality and the nature of human belief.
He argues that just because a rooster crows before dawn does not mean the crowing causes the sun to rise. Humans might believe in this causal relationship due to the constant conjunction of the rooster crowing and the subsequent sunrise, but this belief is based on habit rather than logical necessity. In reality, the crowing of the rooster and the rising of the sun are two distinct events that have no necessary connection, suggesting that our scientific and everyday beliefs are built on habit and psychological conditioning rather than on logical or empirical certainty.
MnemonicMnemonic
Hume also uses the example of a rooster being fed and then killed to further illustrate his point about the limitations of human understanding of causality. Each morning when the farmer comes to feed it, the rooster grows more confident in this association. However, one day, the farmer comes to feed the rooster and then kills it. The rooster’s expectation of being fed by the farmer was based on the habitual conjunction of these events, not on any logical necessity or understanding of the farmer’s true intentions.
Thus, Hume’s rooster example vividly illustrates his skepticism about human assumptions of causation. It shows that just because two events have been constantly conjoined in the past does not mean they will continue to be so in the future. This challenges the epsitemic certainty with which we hold many of our scientific and everyday causal beliefs.
Slide #1
Slide #2